Unambiuous-state-discrimination attack in cryptography with weak coherent states by Dusek, M et al.
Unambiuous-state-discrimination attack in cryptography with weak coherent states
Miloslav Dusek1, Mika Jahma2, and Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus2
1Department of Optics, Palacky´ University, 17. listopadu 50, 772 00 Olomouc, Czech Republic
2Helsinki Institute of Physics, P.O. Box 9, 00014 Helsingin yliopisto, Finland
(October 26, 1999)
The use of linearly independent signal states in realistic im-
plementations of quantum key distribution (qkd) enables an
eavesdropper to perform unambiguous state discrimination.




Quantum key distribution (qkd) is a technique to pro-
vide two parties with a secure, secret and shared key.
Such a key is the necessary ingredient to the only provably
secure way to communicate with guaranteed privacy, the
one-time pad or Vernam cipher [1]. The rst complete
protocol was given by Bennett and Brassard [2] (BB84)
following rst ideas by Wiesner [3]. It uses the fact
that any channel which transmits two non-orthogonal
states perfectly automatically makes eavesdropping on
this channel detectable.
We consider the BB84 protocol in a typical quantum
optical implementation. Ideally, Alice sends a sequence
of single photons which are at random polarized in one
of the following four states: right or left circular polar-
ized, or vertically or horizontally polarized. Bob chooses
at random between two polarization analyzers, one dis-
tinguishing the circular polarized states, and the other
distinguishing the linear polarized states. Following a
public discussion about the basis of the sent signals and
the measurement apparatus applied to them, sender and
receiver can obtain a shared key made up from those sig-
nals where the measurement device gives deterministic
results. This is the sifted key [4]. Proofs of security of
this scheme against the most general attack, even in the
presence of noise, have been obtained [5]. In this arti-
cle we follow another goal: we would like to illuminate to
which extend already very simple attacks can render qkd
impossible once realistic imperfections like lossy lines and
non-ideal signal states are taken into account. The di-
culties implied, for example, by the use of weak coherent
states in combination with lossy lines has been pointed
out earlier [6{8] and this subject has been illuminated
in depth in [9], where bounds on coverable distances are
given. The eavesdropping attacks needed to crack the se-
crecy of the key for set-ups exceeding this distances are
still quite complicated. The eavesdropper needs to per-
form a QND measurement on the total photon number
of the signal, then he has to split a photon o the oc-
curring multi-photon signals [9], store that photon, and
then, nally, measure it after the public discussion.
In this paper we are looking into much simpler eaves-
dropping strategies which make use of the opportunities
arising from lossy lines and non-ideal signals. Such an at-
tack has been proposed by Yuen [7] and uses the fact that
Eve can, with nite probability, discriminate the four sig-
nal states unambiguously. Whenever such a discrimina-
tion was performed successfully, the eavesdropper knows
immediately which of the four signal states was sent and
can send this information via a classical channel to Bob’s
detector, in front of which she places a state preparation
machine to prepare the identied state. This way this
state does not experience the losses of the actual quan-
tum channel without Eve needing to invest into a perfect
quantum channel.
The investigation of this scenario renes Yuen’s anal-
ysis and it illuminates the restrictions placed on imple-
mentations of qkd on lines with strong losses.
II. UNAMBIGUOUS DISCRIMINATION OF
SIGNAL STATES
Unambiguous state discrimination is possible whenever
the N states in question are linearly independent. The
problem can be described by a measurement which can
give the results \state 0", \state 1", . . . \state N−1", and
the result \don’t know". (In the following it turns out to
be more convenient to have parameters to run from 0 to
N − 1.) The constraint is that the measurement results
should never wrongly identify a state, and the goal is to
keep the fraction \don’t know" results as low as possible.
This problem has been investigated by Ivanovic [10] for
the case of two non-orthogonal states. Peres [11] solved
this problem in a formulation with Probability Operator
Measures (POM). This solutions was generalized to an
arbitrary number of equally probable states which are
generated from each other by a symmetry operator by
Chefles and Barnett [12]. Their result can be summarized












where the states jφji represent some set of or-










jφji form another orthonormal
set. It turns out that the optimal strategy for unam-
biguous state discrimination consists of two steps. In the
rst step a lter operation is performed such that the
output states are either the orthonormal states
~Ψ`E or
some linear dependent states. This step can be described
by a complete positive map with the two Kraus operators
dened with the help of the minimum cmin = minj jcj j













jcj j2 jφji hφj j (3)
The conditional states in case of the successful lteringΨ(yes)k E are given now asΨ(yes)k E = pN jc0j ~ΨkE .
In a second step, we can now perform a von Neumann
projection measurement on this state to identify unam-
biguously the state k via the orthonormal state
~ΨkE.
The probability of this successful identication is given
by
PD = N min
j
jcj j2 . (4)
For the case of two non-orthogonal polarization states of
a single photon a quantum optical implementation fol-
lowing this two-step idea has been given by Brandt [13].
III. SIGNAL STATES
A rst description of realistic signal states is that of
a coherent state with a small amplitude α. This corre-
sponds to the description of a dimmed laser pulse. The







where ay is the creation operator for one of the four BB84
polarizations which can be expressed in terms of two cre-
ation operators by1 and b
y
2 (corresponding, e.g., to two






























by1 − i by2

(9)





















We can calculate the values of the cj in terms of the
overlaps of the four states according to the formula [12]






























































The minimum of these four functions depends on the
value of µ. The four functions 4jckj2 are plotted in Fig. 1
from where we can read o PD as the minimum.














FIG. 1. The fourfold weight 4jcj j2 of the four canonical
states jφji as a function of the mean photon number µ. The
lower bound of these four curves gives the optimum probabil-
ity for unambiguous state discrimination.
It turns out, however, that for realistic sources these
states are not the correct description of the situation.
The reason is that Eve does not have a phase reference,
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that means that for a given polarization she does not see
the coherent state jαi but the phase averaged density ma-
trix 12pi
R
φ jeiφαiheiφαj dφ. This results in signals states
which are mixtures of Fock states with a Poissonian pho-







Here the state jni denotes the Fock state with n photons
in one of the four BB84 polarization states. The optimal
strategy to discriminate between the four possible den-
sity matrices consists in a QND measurement on the total
photon number in the modes b1 and b2 together and a fol-
lowing measurement which unambiguously discriminates
between the four resulting conditional states for each to-
tal photon number. The justication for this is that the
total photon number via the QND measurement \comes
free", since the execution of this measurement does not
change the signal states. However, given the resulting
information, we know the optimal strategy on the condi-
tional states according to [12]. Therefore we nd that the
total probability of unambiguous state discrimination PD
is given in terms of the respective probabilities for each










The conditional states resulting from the QND measure-
ment and corresponding to n photons in total satisfy
again the symmetry condition which allows to apply the
results by Chefles and Barnett. We nd for the four co-










































Therefore the maximum probability of unambiguous





0 n  2
1− 21−n/2 n even
1− 2(1−n)/2 n odd.
(24)
It is possible to sum up the contributions from dierent






















This result is compared to the result for coherent states
in Fig. 2. As expected, the probability for unambiguous


























FIG. 2. Comparison of the optimum probability of unam-
biguous states discrimination for coherent states and for the
corresponding mixture of Fock states. Both have the same
Poissonian photon number distribution with mean photon
number µ.
state identication is lower for the mixture of Fock-states
than for the coherent states. An expansion in terms of
the photon number µ gives PD = 112µ
3 + O(µ4) for both
situations. For lower than third order the signal states
are not linearly independent, so that no unambiguous
state discrimination is possible. Note that Yuen [7] gave
a simple beam-splitter setup which obtains a discrimina-
tion probability of PD = 136µ
3 + O(µ4).
IV. UNAMBIGUOUS STATE DISCRIMINATION
AS EAVESDROPPING STRATEGY
We now consider the realistic situation that Alice uses
the phase-averaged coherent states as signal states. They
are still described by a Poissonian photon number distri-
bution with mean photon number µ. Bob’s detectors can
distinguish just presence or absence of the eld and their
detection eciency (including possible losses before de-
tectors at Bob’s part of the apparatus) is ηB . Further, let
the transmittance of the line connecting both the parties
be ηL.
In this scenario we x our eavesdropping strategy, to
which we refer as the unambiguos state discrimination
attack, or usd attack for short, as follows. The unam-
biguous state discrimination allows Eve to identify a frac-
tion of the signals without error. For this fraction, she
can prepare a corresponding state close to Bob’s detector
such that no errors appear for these signals. Whenever
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the identication does not succeed, however, she sends
the vacuum signal to Bob to avoid errors, which there-
fore will not occur in the considered scenario.
We need to study this strategy under realistic con-
straint. As already mentioned Bob’s detector have a -
nite eciency, and they are usually only \yes/no" detec-
tors, which either re, or they do not re { they cannot
distinguish the number of impinging photons. Conse-
quently, for a typical setup, Bob observes just the rate
of clicks of one or the other detector and the rate of
events when both detectors re, each monitoring one of
the orthogonal polarization modes. The latter event will
be observed ideally only when Alice and Bob use dif-
ferent bases, independently of the presence of absence of
an eavesdropper. Eve’s aim is to reproduce these two ob-
servables with the minimum of non-vacuum signals, since
only then she uses the successfully identied signals e-
ciently.
If Eve is not present, Bob’s expected probability of a
detector click, in case Alice and Bob use the same bases,
is
P1 = 1− exp(−ηLηBµ), (26)
as follows from the Poissonian photon-number statistics
of coherent states.
The expected probability of a double click, in case of









What happens in the presence of Eve? This depends on
the signals Eve sends for the successfully detected signals.
A. Eve sends n-photon states
Let us suppose now, that if Eve succeeds in state dis-
crimination she sends a number state containing N pho-
tons to Bob. If she fails she simply sends nothing.
If Alice and Bob use the same basis, only one of two
Bob’s detectors may click (no misalignment or noise is
assumed). The detection probability (in case of a realistic

















(one minus probability of no click multiplied by discrim-
ination probability).
If Alice and Bob use dierent bases, Eve’s signal is
equally distributed to both Bob’s detectors. The proba-
bility to nd k photons at the rst detector and ` photons
at the second one (with included detection eciencies) is






















where the summation limits stem from obvious con-
straints m  k, N − m  `. Thus the probability of














(note that 00 would be subtracted two times). Be-










































B. Eve sends a mixture of number states
Of course, there is no reason to restrict Eve only to
the use of number states. After successful state discrim-
ination she can send to Bob any pure state or mixture.
However, due to the way of Bob’s detection it is enough
to analyze only a number-state mixture with an arbitrary
statistics because only the photon-count statistics of the
states sent by Eve is of importance.
As already mentioned, Bob is interested only in the
number of single clicks (in case that his and Alice’s bases
coincide) and double clicks (if the bases dier). One
can plot very illustrative diagram displaying relations be-
tween corresponding single-click and double-click proba-
bilities (see Fig. 3).
The situation where Eve sends number states to Bob is
represented for each photon number by a dot, which has
been calculated for xed values of ηL and µ. These points
lie on the curve parameterized by a photon number N
with x-coordinate P (N)1 [Eq. (28)] and y-coordinate P
(N)
2
[Eq. (29)]. From Eq. (28) one can express N as
N =
ln(1− x/PD)






























Single-click probability (x )
FIG. 3. Diagram displaying relations between \sin-
gle-click" and \double-click" probabilities. The highlighten
area contains all possible Bob’s detection probabilities stem-
ming from Eve’s activity (described in the text) for a given
detection eciency (here, particularly, ηB = 0.5) and a given
mean photon number in states sent by Alice (µ = 4). It is
an insecure region. The shape of the area depends on ηB , the
scaling on µ [through discrimination probability PD(µ)]. The
separate dotted curve represents a set of all possible \working
points" without an eavesdropper, i.e. a set of all possible pairs
of expected P1 and P2. Particular position of a working point
depends on the values of line transmittance (ηL), detection
eciency (ηB), and mean photon number (µ). The value of
µ = 4 is chosen because then the proportions of the diagram
are so that it is well readable, but the structure is the same
for lower, realistic values.

















Calculating the second derivative of Eq. (30) with respect
to x and using the fact that ηL, ηB , and x/PD are all
from the interval between 0 and 1, it follows that the
curve given by Eq. (30) is convex.
In the diagram (Fig. 3) coordinates of a point corre-
sponding to any mixture of number states can always be
expressed as a linear combination (with non-negative co-
ecients of a unit sum) of coordinates corresponding to
individual number states. Because of convexity of the
above mentioned curve all such points must lie inside
(or on the boundary) of the polygon with vertices at the
points corresponding to number states (i.e. in the area
highlighted in Fig. 3).
V. REGION OF INSECURITY
The area dened in the previous section can be called
a region of insecurity. Once the working point (i.e. the
point whose coordinates are given by expected values
of Bob’s detection probabilities if no eavesdropper is
present) fall into it Eve can get complete information
on the key without a risk of being disclosed.
The set of all possible working points is represented by
a curve in the diagram. Expected single-click probability
P1 [Eq. (28)] represents x-coordinate, expected double-
click probability P2 [Eq. (29)] represents y-coordinate.
From Eq. (26) the exponential can be expressed and sub-
stituted into Eq. (27). Thus the explicit equation of the






Now, the question is for which values of parameters
ηL, ηB , and µ does the working point lie in the region of
insecurity.
VI. NECESSARY CONDITION OF INSECURITY
If the expected probability of single clicks satises P1 >
P
(N)
1 for all N then the working point will certainly not
fall to the region of insecurity. The previous condition is





and verify that this constraint can always be fullled if
the total losses of the apparatus are small enough. In
Fig. 4 the limit values of total eciencies ηLηB are plot-
ted for various mean photon numbers µ.
If the total losses are smaller than a certain level the
working point will not fall into the region of insecurity
for any mean photon number µ. In terms of line trans-






= (1− 2−1/2)  0.293 . (33)
VII. SUFFICIENT CONDITION OF INSECURITY
In this section we will deal with nding precise con-
ditions determining when a working point falls into the
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Mean photon number µ
FIG. 4. If the value of expected single-click probability is
greater then the discrimination probability ( P1 > PD) the
described usd attack can be, in principle, detected. The plot
shows an example of a curve separating the set of values of
total eciencies (ηLηB) and mean photon numbers (in states
sent by Alice) satisfying the above constraint [see inequality
(32)].
region of insecurity. However, we conne ourselves only
to the cases when the working point fall to the triangle
constituted by the three vertices corresponding to num-
ber states with zero, one, and two photons (see Fig 3).
As we will see it is sucient consider this case only for
the most practically interesting cases.
The mentioned connement means that the working
point must lie below the line going through the origin
of coordinates and through the vertex corresponding to
N = 2 and on the left of the line going through vertices
corresponding to N = 1 and N = 2. Coordinates of im-
portant points are collected in Tab. I. The rst condition
can be formalized as follows
xw  yw x2
y2
. (34)
The second one leads to the inequality
xw  yw x2 − x1
y2
+ x1. (35)








Vertex N = 1: x1 = PDηB y1 = 0
Vertex N = 2: x2 = PD(2ηB − η2B) y2 = PDη2B/2
TABLE I. Coordinates of important points
Let us solve the inequality (34) now. Substituting ex-
pressions for all coordinates one obtains
1−R2  2 (1− 2R + R2) 2− ηB
ηB
,























Mean photon number µ
FIG. 5. Plot of the function F (µ, ηL, ηB). The line trans-
mittance and Bob’s detection eciency are xed: ηL = 0.1,
ηB = 0.5. Mean photon number, µ, goes from zero to µ2 limit.
If F is negative the transmission is totally insecure. The zero












4− ηB , 1

.
Thus the mean photon number in coherent states sent by
Alice must be lower than the following limit









For ηL = 0.5 and ηB = 0.8 this limit is about 3.4 pho-
tons and for ηL = 0.01 and ηB = 0.5 it is even about
134.5 photons. Evidently, such a connement does not
represent important limitations for analysis of security of
practical quantum cryptographic systems.
Now let us turn our attention to the condition (35). It
can be expressed in the following form
F (µ, ηL, ηB) := xwηB − 2yw(1− ηB)− PDη2B  0, (37)
Due to the complicated dependence of PD on µ we failed
to nd its analytical solution. However, it is easy to
treat this task numerically. If the function F (µ, ηL, ηB)
is negative or zero (in the interval of mean photon num-
bers from 0 to µ2) the working point lies in the region
of insecurity, i.e. qkd is insecure. In Fig. 5 there is an
example for the values of line transmittance ηL = 0.1
and detection eciency ηB = 0.5 (then µ2  13.46). In
this particular case, the transmission becomes insecure






= ηLη2B > 0 and F (0, ηL, ηB) = 0,
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such (small enough) µ’s always exist that F > 0, i.e. the
communication can be secure { taking into account only
the usd attack.
VIII. ACCESSIBLE LOSS
The results of the previous sections illuminate to which
extend Eve can achieve perfect eavesdropping by mak-
ing an unambiguous state discrimination measurement
followed by sending the identied signals directly to
Bob’s detectors, thereby circumpassing the lossy quan-
tum channel.
However, Eve does not necessarily need to access the
whole lossy quantum channel to be successful. The same
formulas apply if we collect in the quantity ηB all those
losses on the way to Bob’s detector which are not acces-
sible to Eve, while ηL denotes now only that loss that is
accessible to her. It is instructive to look at the limit of
high non-accessible losses (ηB  1). In that case we can









The security requirement F > 0 in the region µ < µ2



















This relation is not unexpected, and it helps to judge
the diculty to perform the simple usd attack for actual
implementations.
The condition (39) is shown in Fig. 6 as solid line. To
make statements about security against the usd attack,
we need to consider additionally condition (36), which
can be approximated by µ < 1ηL in leading order of ηB
and is shown as a dashed line. We now can conclude that
the system is secure against usd attacks in the regime of
small detection eciencies ηB if we are in the parameter
region with F > 0 and µ < µ2. Furthermore, the system
is insecure in the region F < 0 and µ < µ2. For the
region with µ > µ2 we can only make indirect statements.
One is, that if the system is secure for a pair of values
(µ, ηL), then it must be secure for all values (µ, η0L) with
η0L > ηL, otherwise Eve could gain an advantage by not
accessing all the loss available to her. Therefore the only
region about which we cannot make a statement with the
present calculation is the region with µ > 4.1 and ηL > 1µ .
Here more detailed calculation would be necessary.
Note that these considerations are valid for ηB  1
and only in this limit ηB does no longer play any role.
For higher values of ηB this changes.























FIG. 6. The secure parameter regime for the losses acces-
sible to Eve for large overall losses is the region above the
solid line (F > 0). In the region with F < 0 and µ < µ2 the
system is insecure. In the remaining region we have F < 0,
but since µ > µ2, we cannot make any denitive statements
about security.
IX. REMARK TO THE STATISTICAL NATURE
OF THE PROBLEM
One should keep in mind, however, that all Bob’s mea-
surements have a statistical character. Bob does not
measure probabilities but nite numbers of clicks which
naturally fluctuates. In practice Bob must set certain
limits of a \condential interval" of acceptable numbers
of detector clicks. This causes that in some cases Bob
may reject the transmission even if no eavesdropper is
present. The worse news is that there is always some
non-zero probability that Eve will not be detected even
if the working point lies outside the insecurity region.
Note that Eve does not need to eavesdrop all the time
{ she may let a part of the signal sequence pass with-
out any intervention. Her (deterministic) information on
the key decreases with this strategy. But both Bob’s
single- and double-click probabilities also change. The
point corresponding to such an eavesdropping strategy
(in the diagram as in Fig. 3) shifts along the line con-
necting \full-time" Eve’s strategy point with Alice’s and
Bob’s working point. The relative shift equals the frac-
tion of transmission during which Eve is active.
For practical purposes it would be necessary to deter-
mine the probability that Eve’s information on the key
(due to the usd attack) will be smaller than a certain
chosen limit, as a function of the limits of the conden-
tial interval and of the length of the key. This represents
a challenge for the further research in this eld.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantitatively analyzed an attack against re-
alistic quantum crypto systems which enables an eaves-
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dropper to gain information on the key without causing
any errors in case of a lossy channel or poor detection ef-
ciencies. It uses unambiguous discrimination of linearly
independent signal states. This attack does not need any
storing of qubits or complicated quantum gates. How-
ever, the main advantage is that it does not demand to
substitute the lossy quantum channel by a perfect one. A
set of insecure parameters (line transmittances, detector
eciencies and mean photon numbers in coherent states
sent by Alice) is given explicitly. In theory, the signal
can always be chosen to be weak enough to allow secure
communication. In practice, however, the detector noise
places restrictions on that end.
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